This paper addresses the representation of scientific uncertainty about global warming and climate change in the U.S. popular press. An examination of popular press articles about global warming from 1986 to 1995 reveals that scientific uncertainty was a salient theme. The paper describes several forms of uncertainty construction and means through which it was managed. I argue that scientific uncertainty was used to help construct an exclusionary boundary between "the public" and climate change scientists. This rhetorical boundary delegitimated lay knowledge by suggesting that the public did not hold appropriate reverence for scientific uncertainty and the need for more research.
Introduction
An article in a January 1994 issue of Current Health II opened with two, large-print quotations. One quotation read: "New York and Miami will be flooded as sea levels rise from melting polar ice. There will be famine. Health threats. Civil unrest. We have to take action now to prevent a global catastrophe." The other read: "The weather forecasters can't tell us for sure whether it will rain tomorrow, but they're going to predict the temperature for the whole planet 50 years from now! In the 1970s they were telling us the next ice age was coming. Global warming is just another false alarm." 1 After presenting these quotations, the author situated reality somewhere in between, while conceding that much scientific uncertainty still remained. This uncertainty was used to call readers' attention to and show reverence for future scientific research. "Can anything be learned from the global warming controversy? Perhaps the best advice is to 'chill.' Don't jump to conclusions that aren't supported by the data." 2 This paper focuses on two central themes: (1) representations and salience of scientific uncertainty in popular press articles about global climate change, and (2) uses of scientific uncertainty to construct boundaries in the popular press between scientists' knowledge-claims about climate change and public reconstructions of this knowledge. I show that scientific uncertainty was both a salient issue and was enrolled to maintain a rhetorical boundary between scientists' and lay knowledge about climate change. The above quote is a good illustration of these two themes. Scientific uncertainty is represented as a central feature of knowledge about global warming, and readers are told to "chill" and refrain from making claims until scientists have spoken. Below, I explore some different forms through which scientific uncertainty was constructed or represented in the press. I argue that scientific uncertainty was managed such
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misunderstandings of science are a socially constructed phenomenon. These constructions might be used to co-construct a gap between science and non-science, to legitimate resources for science, or to privilege particular forms of science communication. 11 A fourth topic is the press's role in popularizing science. It was once assumed that real science occurred in one setting and then was removed and popularized for public dissemination in another. More recently, Stephen Hilgartner has shown the difficulties of identifying a boundary between science and popularization. 12 Hilgartner argues that claims about popularization (and the simplification or abuse of "real" science that it allegedly involves) serve as a rhetorical resource to help interpret and defend science against outsiders. 13 Others have suggested that in the U.S. the popularization process itself has been driven by the desire to promote public appreciation of science and the benefits it provides for society. 14 With these points in mind, it seems theoretically appropriate 15 to consider popular press representations of science as another arena for doing science. Scientific claims are constructed in the pages of the popular press much as they are in other places, with particular rhetorical features, and within complex and reciprocal relationships among scientists, journalists, and readers. As science is communicated in this arena, scientific claims are being constructed, but so are a social order and arrangement among these three sets of actors. This order and arrangement merits further study.
Uncertainty discourse
Constructivist studies of scientific knowledge have emphasized how uncertainties in knowledge production processes are eliminated or transformed, resulting in more certain claims about the natural world. 16 Recent research also has problematized scientific claims about uncertainty and ignorance in science. 17 Within uncertainty discourse, I include the individual or collective claims that scientific knowledge is incomplete about some feature of nature. 18 These claims can be explicit, such as in the statement: "there is scientific uncertainty about the causal linkage between twentieth-century greenhouse gas emissions and global temperature increases." Or uncertainty discourse might be an outcome of more certain claims. For example, opposing scientific claims might be juxtaposed and lead to the inference that scientists, collectively, are uncertain about some aspect of nature. Several different forms of uncertainty discourse will be explored in more detail in the empirical section below.
Uncertainty discourse is not limited to the popular press. Through such means as constructing gaps in the literature, 19 scientists build uncertainties into their scientific papers. Modalities may be added to knowledge-claims to draw attention to the context of the claims and help reduce the certainty with which they are held. 20 In scientific controversies, scientists may use these and other devices to construct uncertainty about opponents' claims as well. 21 Uncertainty discourse serves numerous purposes in scientific communication. Among scientists, it rhetorically creates a demand for scientific research and can be useful in scientific controversies to draw attention to the inadequacy of opponents' views. In political contexts, uncertainty discourse may be used as authoritative statements that help legitimate a status quo position ("the science is uncertain, so we better wait"), 22 or it may be used as a "boundaryordering device" between advisory scientists and policy makers (i.e., as a commonly held discourse that is both shared by and used to bring social order within and between these two communities). 23 Analyses of scientific uncertainty in the media have emphasized its role in dramatizing accounts. On television shows, for example, a brief "window of uncertainty" may be constructed to dramatize later, more certain accounts. 24 However, less attention has been placed on the implications of scientific uncertainty for the relationship between scientists and the public. Representations of uncertainty could potentially 88 S. C. Zehr diminish the authority of science. Since science is generally perceived as an authoritative, truth-producing profession, acknowledgment of uncertainty might reduce this authority and open access to the production of knowledge to other groups and activities. On the other hand, representations of uncertainty might be managed to augment scientific authority if they place the problem in question more firmly in future scientific research. In the case study reported here, I suggest that the latter was closer to the truth. Uncertainty discourse was used in the press to situate science more centrally within the global warming/climate change problem domain. To understand why, one must examine how uncertainty discourse not only depicts a lack of scientific knowledge, but also how it is managed to co-produce particular identities and social arrangements for science and the public. 25 Toward this end, we must look at the linkage of uncertainty discourse and boundary-work.
Boundary-work
Boundary-work refers to "the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activity as non-science." 26 Boundary-work may perform such professional functions for science as monopolization, expansion, expulsion, and protection. 27 Boundary-work is also reciprocal. As scientists or other spokespersons describe science, they also may depict non-science, constructing a particular identity for practitioners of that activity.
In the global climate change case, boundary-work was significant for the way some claims about scientific uncertainty rhetorically constructed a social hierarchy. In this hierarchy, "the public" was given a very limited or non-existent role in the production of global warming knowledge, while scientists' role was privileged. Uncertainty discourse was used to help protect the authoritative position of science against the possible emergence of more authoritative lay knowledge.
Data
These issues were addressed through an empirical examination of articles on climate change in the U.S. popular press from 1986-1995. Articles from four major newspapers (The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Chicago Tribune, and The Los Angeles Times from 1989-1995) and magazines in the popular press (from 1986-1995) were content analyzed. 28 Articles were identified through searches, using the key terms "global warming" and "global climate change," on the following computerized searching tools: Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Newspaper Abstracts, and Lexis-Nexis. Copies of articles were obtained and read for content. As significant themes related to scientific uncertainty emerged, examples were recorded. Articles were reread several times to identify further examples of emergent and dominant themes. The excerpts below are presented as illustrative examples of these themes.
Global climate change in the press and the salience of uncertainty
The problem of global climate change has received considerable treatment in the U.S. popular press. It was highly dramatized during the late 1980s, with its very hot summers, and with the bold claims of James Hansen in a congressional hearing. According to Sheldon Ungar, the heat and drought of the summer of 1988 created a "social scare" leading to increased media attention and public concern, which attenuated as the scare passed. 29 Even though the novelty and drama surrounding climate change has since declined, the press has been persistent in its coverage, especially in its attention to scientific uncertainty. Scientific uncertainty has served as an important "frame" 30 through which the science of climate change was presented in the press. The salience of scientific uncertainty was reflected in several features of these articles. In many articles, scientific uncertainty was the main topic. For example, a high profile 1991 New York Times Magazine article, entitled "Heating the Global Warming Debate," 31 focused extensively on scientific uncertainty in the debate over rates of global warming. After an initial large print statement that read: "In 1988 scientist Jim Hansen testified that the world was getting hotter: But how hot? And how fast?", the author situated the problem.
Environmentalists conjure images of disaster; industrialists appeal to scientific uncertainty; the media seize on any hint of controversy with intemperate zeal. And climate experts offer scant relief, insisting as they do that the day-to-day fluctuations ordinary people notice aren't nearly as significant as the long-term trends about which they themselves seem to agree." 32 Then, at several successive points throughout the article, the author referred back to the theme of scientific uncertainty. Several other articles also situated scientific uncertainty as the main topic. 33 In other articles, scientific uncertainty appeared in key places. These included titles such as: "Cloud Data Cast Doubt About Atmosphere"; "Global Warming: Experts Ponder Bewildering Feedback Effects"; "With Cloudy Crystal Balls, Scientists Race to Assess Global Warming"; "Global Warming: Uncertainty and Action"; and "U.S. Water Resources Versus an Announced But Uncertain Climate Change." 34 These articles included an opening or closing paragraph (or both), that helped to frame uncertainty within the article. A 1991 New York Times article on an international global warming meeting was typical. It began: "In a contest between uncertain science and uncertain economics, negotiators from around the world convened in Nairobi yesterday for what promises to be a contentious effort. . . ." 35 Further references to uncertainty were placed at several points throughout the article. In another example, a 1992 Chicago Tribune article addressed a theory put forth by a horticulturist that rising CO 2 levels may have beneficial effects in the form of increased plant productivity. However, the article closed with an uncertainty caveat: "But he says that rather than propagating theories as facts, 'the honest observer has to conclude he does not really know what will happen.' " 36 In a third example, scientific uncertainty was developed in a New York Times article in a section entitled, "The Science." 37 Scientific uncertainty also was made salient through direct quotations from scientists or scientific reports. Journalists have wide latitude over what they narrate and what they quote directly from scientists, and the latter have control over how they frame information for journalists. Direct quotations from scientists hold more force than narrative, and there were many instances in which these quotations included uncertainty discourse. For example, in a 1992 Chicago Tribune article, the author attempted to justify President Bush's reluctance to attend the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit the next month. The author explained that it was difficult to make political decisions before research data were clear and that computer models were flawed, as "many papers given at the last annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science pointed out." This was followed by the quote: " 'For the next decade or so, all climate model predictions are expected to suffer from uncertainties,' noted one expert." 38 In another example, a Chicago Tribune article included the following main quote from a 1991 National Academy of Sciences report: "Despite the great uncertainties, global warming is a potential threat sufficient to justify action now." 39 In addition, both journalists and scientists often used attention-getting adjectives to further stress scientific uncertainties. Some examples included: "hellacious" and "enormous;" 90 S. C. Zehr "substantial," "large," "contentious," and "genuine;" 41 and "gaping." 42 Thus, the reference to scientific uncertainty was a very common and salient theme in articles on climate change during the 1986-1995 period. Scientific uncertainty has not been a typical feature of science journalism. 43 Rather, journalists and scientists have tended to de-emphasize the uncertainties associated with specific fields of inquiry as accounts are constructed in public domains. Whether the global climate change case is an exception to this tendency or whether journalists' and scientists' practices have recently changed are unanswered questions.
Forms of uncertainty construction
The above examples of scientific uncertainty were overt and easily detectable. Simply put, journalists and scientists were claiming that scientific uncertainty existed. In this section, I explore more subtle forms through which uncertainty was constructed in press accounts. Three recurrent forms are explored, using the labels: scientific controversy, new research, and expansion of the problem domain. These forms are probably not unique to the global climate change phenomenon. The linkage between scientific controversy and uncertainty, in particular, has been discussed in other cases. 44 
Scientific controversy
Uncertainty was constructed through the practice of interjecting and emphasizing controversy or disagreement among scientists. From a science journalism standpoint, controversy and disagreement often create drama in accounts and may provide journalists with a guise of objectivity because it appears that they are presenting both sides. 45 However, scientific uncertainty is also constructed by the lack of scientists' collective agreement about one specific aspect of nature, even though each expert may be certain of his or her view. Occasionally, journalists explicitly drew this connection between disagreement and scientific uncertainty. For instance, a 1990 Los Angeles Times article advised readers: "The way to separate values from science is to. . . listen for agreement (scientific certainty, as far as it goes) and disagreement (scientific uncertainty, all mixed up with values)." 46 Scientific controversy and disagreement were developed in three ways. First, journalists contrasted areas of research in which there was much scientific agreement with areas in which there was little or no agreement. A Los Angeles Times article on the effects of ocean warming in Monterey Bay was typical. The following paragraph identified points of controversy.
There is broad agreement among scientists that the Earth has gotten warmer by at least a degree during the past 100 years. But there is considerable controversy over the impact climate change is having on the Earth. There is also much disagreement on whether human-generated greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide are fueling the increase in temperature and whether they could lead to disastrous fluctuations in weather patterns. 47 This type of contrast (area of agreement versus disagreement) was a common feature. It provided a quick review of the state of scientific knowledge and helped to organize articles. The above quotation, for instance, produced a framework through which the specific study of Monterey Bay was connected to a global problem. These contrasts also brought attention to scientific controversy along with uncertainty.
Second, journalists focused on controversy and disagreement among scientists within a specific area of research. These existed among scientists in general:
These gases-principally carbon dioxide and methane-are believed by some scientists to trap [additional] heat in the atmosphere, leading to potentially catastrophic climate changes. It is something to worry about, but there is deep scientific division over the threat, or whether global warming even is under way. 48 They existed among communities of researchers:
Those who disagree with what Hansen says-one climatologist calls them "greenhouse agnostics"-fall into three sects. . . Those who don't believe the temperature record. . . is reliable enough to demonstrate a warming trend. Those who agree that there has been a warming but aren't sure blame can be assigned solely to increases in the emissions of greenhouse gases. . . . Those who don't think anyone understands climate well enough to predict the meteorological effects of global warming. 49 They existed among individual scientists, who were singled out because of their dissenting views. Scientists such as Richard Lindzen, Fred Singer, Patrick Michaels, and Robert Balling Jr. were quoted numerous times in the popular press because they disagreed with much of the climate change scientific community and because their public statements tended to invoke controversy. 50 These individuals were given a disproportionate amount of space in the press, perhaps because climate change itself was a disputatious public issue 51 or, quite possibly, because of their connections to the energy industry. 52 Third, scientific disagreement was presented almost as a journalistic reflex to help situate the article in the global warming category. For example, a short Chicago Tribune article on the high average earth temperature in 1991 contained this caveat at the end:
Many researchers have expressed concern about global warming in recent years. . . . But others have questioned some of the dire predictions, and scientists continue collecting information to try to determine any actual changes in climate. 53 The author then added a quote from a scientist: " 'We need many more months before we can say for sure.' " 54 Taken literally, the statement would have called into question all the information reported in the article. Its inclusion, however, speaks to a perceived need to add the uncertainty caveat, so as to eliminate possible perceptions or claims of journalistic bias.
These three forms of representing controversy and disagreement helped construct scientific uncertainty within numerous articles. Was this form of uncertainty used to imply limitations in the perceived objectivity and utility of science, as some have suggested for other cases? 55 As scientific controversy was opened for public inspection, did journalists suggest that scientists simply hold varying "opinions" rather than objective knowledge and that readers draw their own conclusions? Though there were few instances of expansion on this question, those journalists and scientists who did expand on it drew a different conclusion (with a couple of exceptions). Their conclusion was to wait for further scientific research to sort things out. As a Chicago Tribune article concluded: "There are, then, legitimate experts on all sides of the greenhouse theory. And all the rest of us can do is wait for more facts to clear matters up so we can decide whether-and how much-to change our lives." 56 
New research
Scientific uncertainty was constructed by connecting new study topics and new research methods and techniques to global climate change solutions. Articles that included this form addressed an esoteric and interesting new research project, along with personal information (and some quotes) about the scientist(s) conducting the study. From the sociology of social problems literature, we know that new topics and stories are appealing and important because they help maintain novelty about the problem. Since social problems easily grow stale and are in constant competition with other issues for public attention, 57 novelty helps retain the problem on the public agenda.
Novelty was created in articles on global warming through the representation of a research project or method as a fresh and inventive means for resolving a key question. However, as this research was described, more scientific uncertainty was constructed. That is, each new study or technique was presented as important and novel precisely because it might answer hitherto unanswered but significant questions. The extensive focus on new research implied that there were many unanswered questions. Furthermore, scientists who were quoted in these articles typically reconfirmed this state of scientific uncertainty.
Most accounts of new research involved novel means for measuring global warming or climate change. A 1991 BioScience article entitled, "Does coral bleaching mean global warming?", was typical. 58 The article began with the question: "Where is the proof that one politician would need to convince others of the reality of global warming and the potential seriousness of its consequences?" 59 It then proceeded with a general discussion of coral bleaching, which, the author noted, is affected by physiological stress, pollution, eutrophication, and sedimentation, and has been increasing in the Caribbean. Then, it returned to global warming: "Can coral reefs serve as biological indicators of global warming?" 60 One scientist (Ernest H. Williams of the University of Puerto Rico) answered affirmatively: "The first proof of global warming may well come from the bleaching of the fragile and highly sensitive coral reef system." 61 However, Williams quickly added: "Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to fully evaluate this intriguing suggestion." 62 The article then continued, noting the potential importance of coral bleaching for detecting global warming and the need for more research funding to collect data. It concluded with yet another twist. According to Walter C. Jaap of the State of Florida Department of Natural Resources, coral reef degradation may not only indicate global warming but also "enhance the greenhouse effect." However, "other scientists are reluctant to reach so strong a conclusion from the limited data currently available." 63 This format existed in many articles. A new research study or technique was introduced and described in some detail. Then the author, or more typically a scientist, cautioned that there were insufficient data or some uncertainties associated with the research. Each study took on increased significance with its association with global warming, but at the same time more scientific uncertainty about global warming was constructed.
The above example was coral bleaching. Other examples that fit this pattern included: an underground laboratory in northern Michigan, 64 studies of bore hole records, 65 snow cover monitors, 66 ice core drilling in the Greenland, Laurentide, Antarctica, and Tibetan Plateau ice sheets, 67 glacier and ice sheet melting rates, 68 changes in ocean acoustics, 69 paleontological studies of ancient swamps, 70 Swedish tree rings, 71 ranges of the woodland deer mouse, 72 and the possibility of launching a constellation of satellites that will warn against missile launches and also, "with the left hand," monitor global warming. 73 In each case, the appeal of new and often esoteric research was combined with its implications for a significant (and dramatic) environmental problem. This practice made for fascinating reading, but also helped construct scientific uncertainty.
Expansion of the problem domain
Uncertainty was constructed through the recurrent inclusion of more research problems within the broader category of global climate change, leading to an expansion of the problem. This practice is a common feature of representations of environmental and other social problems that incorporate scientific knowledge. 74 For scientists, funding opportunities and visibility are enhanced if their particular research project is linked to a larger public issue. Similarly, journalists link scientific research projects to larger public concerns in their articles as a means for increasing their salience. However, as different research problems are connected to an environmental problem, the domain of the latter appears to expand. As it expands, both in its entirety and in individual aspects, there seems to be more scientific uncertainty about the problem. More research appears to be needed before one can claim a definitive understanding of the problem.
An article in Reader's Digest provides a good example. Entitled "What is the truth about global warming?", it began with James Hansen's remarks at a Senate hearing in which he concluded, with much certainty, that the greenhouse effect is changing our climate now. The author then asked questions of and quoted scientists who claimed that the problem was less extreme than the public believed it was or that there was still much uncertainty. Following these quotes, the problem domain was expanded, leading to yet further uncertainty.
Oceans have a major effect upon climate, but scientists have only begun to understand how. . . . How heat travels through the atmosphere and back into space is another big question mark for the global-warming theory. So is the sunspot cycle, as well as the effect of atmospheric pollution and volcanic particles that can reflect sunlight back into space. Such factors throw predictions about global warming into doubt. 75 The author then blamed the media for perpetuating hysteria in face of "the facts" and concluded with a quote from global warming skeptic, Patrick Michaels.
We still know far too little to be stampeded into rash, expensive proposals. Before we take such steps, says Patrick J. Michaels. . . "the science should be much less murky than it is now." Further research and climatic monitoring are certainly warranted. 76 In this example, the author's intentions were clear: to argue that global warming was not severe and to raise questions that elicit further research. In other articles, journalists addressed a specific climatic concern, linked it to global warming, then added a statement about scientific uncertainties associated with the linkage. For example, a 1991 USA Today article briefly discussed a scientist's claim about severe hurricane activity and global warming. "More severe and devastating hurricanes may be the result of a predicted global warming trend from the greenhouse effect, claims Jay Hobgood. . . [of] Ohio State University." 77 However, we quickly get to the caveat: ". . . but he cautions that it hasn't been proved yet. 'With what we know now, it certainly seems logical that hurricanes will be stronger because of global warming. But it's a complicated problem. We're just beginning to answer some of the questions.' " 78 Other, similar cases of expanding the climate change problem included articles on the impacts of: sulfur emissions, 79 sunspot activity (possibly "weakening" the sun), 80 the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, 81 and clouds. 82 Each of these phenomena certainly could be linked, in important ways, to climate change. However, when these additional concerns were reported in the press, they had the effect, among other things, of increasing perceptions of scientific uncertainty. Each article suggested that scientific uncertainty existed in that particular research project. Because of its connection to global warming, these uncertainties were transferred to the larger problem.
Management of uncertainty
As scientific uncertainty was constructed in the press, it also was represented as manageable. In previous research, Shackley and Wynne have shown how, in political contexts, scientific 94 S. C. Zehr uncertainty was rhetorically managed so that it helped maintain socially ordered scientific and political worlds. 83 Somewhat similar features of uncertainty management were found in the popular press. Three modes of management were discernable.
Uncertainty as accountable
Scientific uncertainties were represented as accountable and explainable. Reasons were given for uncertainty, including the complexity of the problem, the lack of refined computer models, and insufficient data. As a 1989 Popular Science article explained:
The reason for large uncertainties. . . is that global models are not refined enough, and the computers they run on are not powerful enough, to cope with the hideous complexities of the problem. Nor have researchers been acquiring enough data. . . to fine tune the models, which now can only give crude approximations of a monstrously complex global system. 84 Through these accounts, journalists and scientists made scientific uncertainty appear less a consequence of ignorance than of current limitations in the state of research. The uncertainties could be clearly articulated.
Uncertainty parameters
Explicit parameters were placed around some features of scientific uncertainty. One parameter was a temperature range for future global warming, which also has been a salient feature of several major scientific reports. 85 In popular press articles, it was generally represented as a more definitive range for global warming. For example, a 1991 Chicago Tribune article reported: "The best forecasts available from general circulation models of the atmosphere predict temperature increases of 3 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit if greenhouse gases double." 86 Occasionally, journalists took the mid-point in this range as the best prediction, making the uncertainties appear even more manageable. 87 Another parameter was a future time point when scientific uncertainties would be completely or significantly reduced. Depending on the article, this future point extended from a few years to a couple of decades, but in each case readers were left assured of a future scientific resolution. For example, a Scientific American article suggested that decades were needed. "Most of these questions can be answered definitively only by decades of additional data gathering." 88 A Business Week article identified five to ten years as the time needed before the detection of a global warming signal. "But even scientists who believe a warming is under way concede it will be at least 5 to 10 years before they find the 'smoking gun' or 'guns' that signal it-and enough evidence to indicate that CO 2 is the cause." 89 Less time was needed if less certainty was required. "It's possible that the models could yield the accuracy needed by policy-makers in 3 to 5 years-provided the government accelerates the pace of climate research with a major infusion of funds." 90 In several instances, a crystal ball metaphor 91 was used to depict the current state of scientific uncertainty and a future, much clearer, state of knowledge. A BioScience article ended: "The dilemma of deciding when to act on the climate change problem, Schneider said, boils down to 'our need to gaze into a very dirty crystal ball. . . the tough judgment to be made is precisely how long to clean the glass before acting on what we think we see inside.' " 92 With both of these parameters, scientific uncertainty about climate change appeared less as a representation of ignorance or failures in science, than a controllable phenomenon open to rational prediction within science.
Uncertain knowledge and policy
The implications of scientific uncertainty for policy were interpreted quite differently in the articles. Two main interpretations were presented: that an emissions reduction policy was premature or that it was necessary to provide effective insurance. Traditionally, the dominant argument has been that policy should wait until scientific research is completed. This way of managing uncertainty has been discussed by Brian Campbell 93 and others, and need not be further developed here. The basic idea is that scientific uncertainty about a problem means that policy action cannot be rationally developed until these uncertainties are resolved. There were many examples of this interpretation in the press. However, many journalists and scientists objected to this policy implication. Also, extensive criticism was levied on this wait-and-see approach in the U.S. acid rain case. 94 Consequentially, scientific uncertainty was also interpreted to mean that mitigating legislation could, and should, be supported. One means for translating scientific uncertainty in this way was through the use of an insurance metaphor, made popular by a National Academy of Sciences panel and a book by Stephen Schneider. Given the existence of scientific uncertainties, the argument was that it would be wise to take some action as "insurance" against possibly very negative consequences. 95 These preliminary steps would allow further scientific research to unfold without the extra pressure on scientists of an expedited research program. Policy could be subsequently adjusted to meet this new knowledge. Scientific uncertainty about global warming was managed in this sense by framing it within specified risks for which insurance could be purchased.
With these and other forms of management, scientific uncertainty appeared less threatening to established cultural and social patterns and as a phenomenon that could be adequately addressed within current institutional arrangements. Global warming did not appear out of control and potentially disruptive to traditional social patterns and sources of authority and action. Rather, the management of scientific uncertainty made science and government appear quite capable of handling the problem through preexisting channels. This mode of representing scientific uncertainty was quite compatible, reciprocally, with public identities constructed in these articles. This forms the next topic.
Boundary-work and the construction of public/science relations
These representations of scientific uncertainty occasionally were enlisted to construct a "public" (as well as a "media" and a "politics," which influence this public) and to identify its relationship to "science." Boundaries were so situated that "the public" was differentiated from "science," and was rhetorically excluded from holding legitimate knowledge, values, and opinions about global warming. This public was construed as misinformed or rash in its conclusions, in contrast to science and scientists who were skeptical, deliberate, and held an appropriate respect for uncertainties in the knowledge.
Three boundary dimensions were emphasized. First, the public was said to be alarmist and sometimes hysterical about global warming (often due to environmentalists' and the media's influence), in contrast to scientists' more measured views and admissions of uncertainty. For example, a Chicago Tribune article blamed environmentalists for apocalyptic views, contrasting them with researchers' understanding of what is known and not known about climate change:
The debate about global warming has seemed to mix science fiction and science fact. Many environmentalists conjure up apocalyptic visions of a world gone awry within the lifetime of today's children: Dust storms swirling across the no-longer-fertile corn 96 S. C. Zehr belt, parts of Florida and California submerged by rising sea levels due to melting polar ice caps, violent storms, tropical diseases spreading into temperate zones. That is unfortunate because it confuses (1) what specialists know with some certainty about the basic physics of global warming with (2) some of the most uncertain science, which has to do with exactly how and when climate changes would affect different parts of the planet. 96 An article in Reader's Digest suggested that facts sometimes get lost in the hysteria and panic surrounding an environmental problem. This was due, according to Stephen Schneider (quoted in the article), to scientists' need to make popular statements dramatic in order to receive public attention. Though it was admitted that scientists were the source of the drama, it was deemed justifiable to shake up a public inattentive to scientific facts.
The buildup of greenhouse gases is cause for scientific study, but not for panic. Yet the facts sometimes get lost in the hysteria. Stephen Schneider confesses to an ethical dilemma. He admits the many uncertainties about global warming. Nevertheless, to gain public support through media coverage, he explains that sometimes scientists "have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements, and make little mention of any doubts we might have." 97 Ironically, even though scientific uncertainty was a salient theme in the press, this article suggested that it had been de-emphasized by scientists due to the need to gain public support.
Why was the public so alarmist? This may have been due to their emotional approach to the topic, in contrast to scientists' more balanced perspectives. In a New York Times article, for example, then Energy Secretary James D. Watkins was quoted as saying: "People with scientific backgrounds realize there are still too many uncertainties to undertake expensive control measures. . . . Non-scientists are simply becoming emotional on the topic." 98 In sum, this boundary dimension depicted a public that over-reacted to the problem, in contrast with a scientific community well aware of existing uncertainties, and more measured in their response.
Second, the public raced to conclusions about global warming, in contrast to the organized skepticism and slow deliberations of scientists. The public lacked the ability to place day-today events in the context of long-term natural climatic variation. For example, in response to a journalist's question about whether the "man in the street" can recognize when global warming has arrived, James Hansen responded:
You can't stick your head out the window to look for the greenhouse effect unless you're clever enough to compare the climate to what it was a few decades ago. . . . The problem that people have is not recognizing the magnitude of natural variability, which is large in comparison to the warming. 99 This inability, a 1989 Chicago Tribune article lamented, meant that a short period of cold weather might change public and media perceptions about global warming.
There may be a blizzard tomorrow. It could rain every day in March. Summer '89 could be memorably cold and wet. That wouldn't change scientists' forecasts about the greenhouse effect or the mathematical models that predict it. But a change in the weather could dampen public-and media-perceptions that the greenhouse effect is an imminent danger. That, in itself, would increase the risks for all of us. 100 The quickness to jump to conclusions also meant that the public had left science far behind. Members of the public were making claims about climate change well before these claims were properly evaluated by scientists.
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In their haste to confront this future calamity, the laymen have left science, and scientists, far behind. There is nothing remotely like scientific consensus that global warming is occurring or, if it is, that it will have disastrous consequences. A respectable body of opinion in the international scientific community holds that any climate warming is as likely to be beneficial as harmful, acting as a hedge against global cooling.
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Third, the public was careless in its talk and opinions, paying insufficient attention to scientific evidence and the process of science. For example, an interview with atmospheric scientist Robert Charlson in Discover revealed the "fuzziness" of public talk, in contrast to the need for long-term scientific research to unveil uncertainties.
The fuzzy carelessness of most public talk about world climate seems to offend him personally. To his mind, the aerosol results are a perfect illustration of the extent to which we don't know what we're doing. . . . "We need a decades-long intensive scientific inquiry, because in reality these things are not going to submit to quick answers. . . . There are substantial uncertainties." 102 In another example, the former governor of the state of Washington, Dixy Lee Ray (an outspoken critic of U.S. environmentalism), began her article by asking whether the facts agreed with what "everyone says."
It appears that nearly everyone believes that "global warming" and "ozone depletion" are serious problems from which the Earth must be saved! Why? Because everyone says so. But what of the evidence? What data support these fears? Are there any contrary facts? 103 The article then continued with the revelation of these contrary scientific facts that "everyone" is unaware of. These scientific facts were constructed, in essence, as lying in a realm distinct from the public.
The main problem, according to a Scientific American article, was that public knowledge was based on the overuse and loose usage of the term "global warming" by editors and newscasters. This public knowledge failed to incorporate the ongoing debate among scientists. The article began:
When editors and newscasters routinely bandy about the term "global warming" without bothering to explain it, then the ideas could be said to have entered the body of public knowledge, accepted by most as immutable fact. Yet the public's acceptance of global warming caused by the greenhouse effect belies the fluid nature of the science. The conclusion that the buildup of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases might lead to catastrophic warming of the earth's climate continues to generate debate among scientists. 104 In sum, apocalyptic thought, quickness to jump to conclusions, and carelessness were descriptions used to represent public knowledge about global warming. In contrast, scientific knowledge was beset with uncertainty and scientists recognized a need for more research. Through this boundary-work two key features of public identity were constructed: a singular, homogeneous public and a misinformed public. The singular, homogeneous public contrasts with results of studies of the public understanding of science. These studies have noted the diverse interests, concerns, goals, and values among different publics in their connections to science. 105 The simplification of "public" misrepresented this complexity. With the misinformed public, journalists and climate change scientists described a public that lacked legitimate knowledge because it did not understand and ignored scientists' appreciation for the 98 S. C. Zehr uncertainties. Even though scientists themselves were uncertain, their knowledge was deemed superior to public viewpoints, which allegedly did not exhibit this same uncertainty.
Though there were occasional calls for public action, the construction of a misinformed public logically could have had the opposite result. The public was expected to be interested in scientists' research, but not hold an active role in the debate. This type of boundary performed what Gieryn calls a "monopolization" function, whereby science maintains its authoritative position over climate change knowledge to the exclusion of non-scientific knowledge. 106 Occasionally, this monopolization was made explicit. As a New York Times article put it after reviewing some of the uncertainties: "For the next few years, the public and policy makers will have to rely on all these efforts [improvements in climate models] to tell them what is happening." 107 The management of uncertainty in the press in this way can be contrasted to its management in policy settings. There, according to Shackley and Wynne, 108 scientific uncertainty served as a boundary ordering device. This meant that it gave science advisers and policy makers a common discourse when they were brought together, as well as one that could be flexibly reshaped for particular purposes in their separate social worlds. In the popular press, however, scientific uncertainty served a monopolistic function that rhetorically separated the scientific and public worlds.
The "misinformed public" identity also can be contrasted with public knowledge, values, and opinions about global warming and other environmental problems depicted in surveys and personal interviews. Recent studies of environmental values and knowledge in American society have shown that people use language and concepts and hold understandings that are different from those of environmental scientists. 109 However, rather than incomplete or distorted versions of scientists' models, people draw upon their own cultural models of global warming and environmental problems that are internally consistent and make sense to them. In particular, people view nature as a "highly interdependent system in a balanced state, vulnerable to unpredictable chain reactions triggered by human disturbance." 110 Their attitudes toward global warming and other environmental problems are well integrated with such values as parental responsibility, obligation to descendants, traditional religious teachings, and protecting nature for its own sake. These values, and the "cultural models" that emerge with them, incorporate concern about future effects of global warming and associated climate changes. As the authors of one study have noted, however, those attitudes are yet to be translated into significant individual or collective action (beyond recycling). 111 Quite possibly, the limited role given to the public in the press and the delegitimation of their knowledge have contributed to this inaction.
Conclusion
The argument can be summarized in four successive points: (1) Scientific uncertainty was a highly salient theme in climate change articles; (2) Scientific uncertainty was constructed through various, sometimes unintentional, processes, including representations of controversy, new research topics, and an expanding problem domain; (3) Scientific uncertainty was managed in the press such that science remained an authoritative knowledge provider for climate change. An important part of this management involved the use of uncertainty in the construction of boundaries between science and the public; (4) These boundaries, in turn, constructed a "misinformed public" identity. This identity may itself be misinformed but, more importantly, it may contribute to inaction among publics who are so represented.
These results suggest a need for further research into how the press communicates scientific uncertainty and ignorance and their reception by various publics. A couple of recent works help develop this analysis. 112 In particular, this research must differentiate between the practice of identifying scientific uncertainties in science where they exist, and making them dominant and salient features of articles, perhaps to the exclusion of other scientific news. We also must examine the use of scientific uncertainty as a basis for constructing a misinformed public that allegedly does not hold appropriate reverence for scientific process. To what extent does this construction persist beyond the climate change case and to what extent does it serve to delegitimate lay knowledge?
This analysis also opens questions, certainly not for the first time, about the appropriate mix (and processes for obtaining that mix) of scientific and lay knowledge in environmental and other problem domains. An important beginning point is the elimination of the type of boundary-work in the press described above. The construction of a misinformed public will only hinder the expression of lay ideas, concerns, and actions. In a case like global climate change, with all its potential consequences, this point is only too obvious. In contrast, more diverse public identities might be constructed that minimally allow for expression of different ideas. One avenue for creating this diversity is through linkages between global or national problems and local concerns. 113 Tying global climate change to local climate change seems an easy and logical step in this direction.
